Posted on Linked In by Chandru
The crash of Germanwings Flight 9525 on the 24th of March, 2015 will always be remembered as a tragedy and an aviation industry accident. Learning from it will, hopefully, lead to actions that make flying safer for all. We have already seen new regulation in the aviation industry that requires at least two authorized personnel to be present in the cockpit at all times.
Here are my thoughts on why this is more than an aviation industry accident and something for Health & Safety professionals to factor as they go about their jobs.
The risk event in this case was the crash, resulting from a psychosocial Hazard - in this case the mental wellbeing of the co-pilot. Psychosocial hazards, as you may know, include but aren’t limited to stress, violence and other workplace stressors. Health and Safety professionals are undoubtedly familiar with identifying hazards and performing a risk analysis. However in the consideration of hazards, it is almost always an effort to identify “potentially harmful energies”. Aspects like mental stress are probably identified but perhaps not given as much attention as they deserve – because these are not “engineering” hazards. It is also possible that these are not easy to detect in the first place. Thus there is a belief that having management commitment and a policy on mental well-being is a “preventive” measure which is sufficient to mitigate an occurrence. We know this is not true!
I recently had a chance to attend a briefing session by the regulatory agency in Singapore outlining the plans to implement the “Safety Case” regime which will be effective mid-2017. A Safety Case is one which a major hazards installation (such as an oil refinery) makes to the regulators, setting out how risks from major accidents hazards can be reduced to as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP), ensuring safe operations in a sustainable manner. I had a chance to query the regulator on the kind of controls that were envisaged and specifically if this included, as part of the risk assessment process, consideration to risks that may occur due to the mental well-being, or otherwise, of the operator of a critical process. From the response, it was clear that the focus was restricted to a Quantitative Risk Assessment and a Process Hazards Analysis on the “technical” aspects of the plant operation and not on the operator / technician. To me, this was a classic example of focusing on trying to “engineer” safety and missing on the psychosocial hazard – which theoretically could pose as much of a safety risk, if not more. I would hope there would be further consideration on this matter before it becomes a regulatory requirement.
My message to Health & Safety professionals: Do not underestimate the importance of psychosocial hazards. In a fast paced world, this could be as, if not more, significant than other risks resulting from harmful energies.
I, for one, would be keen to learn more about how your organizations may have addressed this issue. Do share your thoughts.
The crash of Germanwings Flight 9525 on the 24th of March, 2015 will always be remembered as a tragedy and an aviation industry accident. Learning from it will, hopefully, lead to actions that make flying safer for all. We have already seen new regulation in the aviation industry that requires at least two authorized personnel to be present in the cockpit at all times.
Here are my thoughts on why this is more than an aviation industry accident and something for Health & Safety professionals to factor as they go about their jobs.
The risk event in this case was the crash, resulting from a psychosocial Hazard - in this case the mental wellbeing of the co-pilot. Psychosocial hazards, as you may know, include but aren’t limited to stress, violence and other workplace stressors. Health and Safety professionals are undoubtedly familiar with identifying hazards and performing a risk analysis. However in the consideration of hazards, it is almost always an effort to identify “potentially harmful energies”. Aspects like mental stress are probably identified but perhaps not given as much attention as they deserve – because these are not “engineering” hazards. It is also possible that these are not easy to detect in the first place. Thus there is a belief that having management commitment and a policy on mental well-being is a “preventive” measure which is sufficient to mitigate an occurrence. We know this is not true!
I recently had a chance to attend a briefing session by the regulatory agency in Singapore outlining the plans to implement the “Safety Case” regime which will be effective mid-2017. A Safety Case is one which a major hazards installation (such as an oil refinery) makes to the regulators, setting out how risks from major accidents hazards can be reduced to as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP), ensuring safe operations in a sustainable manner. I had a chance to query the regulator on the kind of controls that were envisaged and specifically if this included, as part of the risk assessment process, consideration to risks that may occur due to the mental well-being, or otherwise, of the operator of a critical process. From the response, it was clear that the focus was restricted to a Quantitative Risk Assessment and a Process Hazards Analysis on the “technical” aspects of the plant operation and not on the operator / technician. To me, this was a classic example of focusing on trying to “engineer” safety and missing on the psychosocial hazard – which theoretically could pose as much of a safety risk, if not more. I would hope there would be further consideration on this matter before it becomes a regulatory requirement.
My message to Health & Safety professionals: Do not underestimate the importance of psychosocial hazards. In a fast paced world, this could be as, if not more, significant than other risks resulting from harmful energies.
I, for one, would be keen to learn more about how your organizations may have addressed this issue. Do share your thoughts.